What is the position of systemaccounting on monetary policy?

A:

"Monetary policy" is a golden calf. While there is yet a legitimate reason to alter the money supply, it does not include protecting state-chartered lending companies from a failure in judgement. Furthermore, producing a scientific measure of the price of money has nothing to do with deferring to the expectations of state-appointed officials who are quick to offer up the wealth created by the private sector to state-chartered lending companies requiring "regulation".

The systemaccounting standard requires, without exception, a law of conservation of value & liability to be enforced throughout its system. To understand the implication of requiring a conservation law from a money supply, consider the example of an economic actor attempting to operate a "bank" within systemaccounting:

A person seeking to operate a lending company solicits funds from other users.

The new lender has received permission to create transactions on behalf of 10,000 accounts, each storing $500, thus capitalizing & empowering the manager of this new business to lend $5 million.

10 individuals approach the lender, and each one requests to borrow $500,000 for 3 years. Indeed, the request to "borrow" money is more appropriately defined as offering to sell a note promising to repay the contacted sum, interest included, to the lender at a later time. Offering to sell a note (borrow money) is to produce risk. Offering to purchase a note (lend money) is to consume risk. 

Despite the risk, the lender judges the value of the opportunity contained in each note to be TRUE in 3 years, and lends the money (purchases 10 notes).

When one of the owners of the originating accounts inquires from the lender about the balance of their account, the lender replies, "Zero."

Perhaps increasing the Notes Receivables of a "bank" and NOT decreasing the Cash account belonging to a "depositor" is an acceptable cross-firm balancing transaction to an economist, but not to a physicist. Such an exception is an absurdity that violates the law of conservation in favor of 1) someone who refuses to accept the full cost of default for lending money to a professional lender, and 2) a professional lender who refuses to physically prove their judgement as worthy of credit in the credit market. 

Under systemaccounting rules, the moment money leaves "the vault", the U.S. Treasury is declaring the borrower to be the money's new owner, and at least 1,000 of the accounts managed by the lender to be fractional owners of a new note (each time their accounts were used to lend money, account owners receive a receipt offering congratulations on the purchase of a new note). 

The authority of the U.S. Treasury to declare a change in ownership of property does not, and will never come from a mandate furnished by the democratic process insofar as this declaration is a fact identifying a mutually-agreed upon measure by which a pair of human beings exercised their free will. Therefore, a "bank" has no physical right to declare the money lent to someone else as "still owned by the depositor". Permitting a "bank" to contradict both the U.S. Treasury and The Physical Universe by double-counting money's ownership is to allow the "bank" to define its own creditworthiness in an alternative universe with a future the economy must reconcile after the creditworthiness was proven undue (a promise goes unfulfilled).

Creditworthiness is a measure of the frequency with which one physically fulfills their word, or fulfilled/promised. A person who fulfills their word 5 out of 10 times (5/10) is 50% creditworthy. When selling notes (borrowing money), the numerator is "delivered", and when purchasing notes (lending money), the numerator is "received" ("fulfilled" accommodates either direction).

The reason why "banks" are allowed to add whatever notes they purchase from borrowers to the money supply is because the U.S. Treasury's "bank" chartering process grants them the privilege of defining their own standard of creditworthiness: "BANK" = received/promised. Should one's creditworthiness be measured according to the government charter they receive instead of the measure which the credit market tests all other firms, the amount of money promised in the denominator will grow increasingly large because fulfilling promises (numerator) is second to being a "bank", "I'm exempt from proving all the promises I purchase from other people are fulfilled before more money is offered to me. And when I do receive more money, I'm allowed to pretend as though it's still in my possession after I lend it to someone else. I receive both privileges because I'm a BANK. "

When untested, unearned, yet government-ordained creditworthiness attempts to raise an economy up through the constant stacking, compounding, and renewing of debt, the only possible outcome for the unfortunate ones sent to labor at the top of this 'Tower of Promises' is a collapse through what is only the most recent artificially-sustained floor having no other purpose but to avoid triggering the structurally-inherent sinkhole of accumulated & deflected default risk scattered throughout previous levels. 

Economists may not see a problem with placing the cart before the horse where the measure of creditworthiness is concerned, or sending multiple generations to be swallowed whole by an unsympathetically-expanding denominator of "money promised", but a physicist will openly recognize that the burden these generations are forced to carry as a result of this false unit of measurement has unjustly caused them to be both slaves and sacrifices to it. Ask a physicist how much an animal can comfortably haul and their answer will come from first measuring this limit. Asking how much risk a human can haul is no different.

There are no entities within systemaccounting that may count their receivables as part of the money supply because conserving both value & liability during a transaction seals financial risk between its producer and consumer. The U.S. Treasury is recognized by systemaccounting to supply the service of bookkeeping the transmission of value's ownership between buyers and sellers of goods & services in the form of money. Regardless of the medium used to record the transmission of value (paper, hard disk, etc.), this mathematical object increases the efficiency of trade by allowing its users to i) measure and relate goods & services in terms of numbers, while ii) remaining mathematically certain of what they are owed after servicing the demand of others. Money is already an axiomatically complete service, so when a government chooses to add to it by centralizing a borrowing & lending function through the "bank" chartering process, the perfection upheld by the calculus of value's ownership is violated to create an environment of statistical ambiguity that accommodates the falsely-assumed credit-worthiness of firms facing little accountability for the risk they socialize & multiply throughout the system.

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